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Reading Literature and the Political Ecology of Gestures 
in the Age of Semiocapitalism 
 
Yves Citton 
 
Gestures are central to our aesthetic experiences. This is not only true of choreography, 
theater and music, but of literature as well. In the following pages, I will (somewhat 
presumptuously) attempt to reframe our perception of the last three hundred years of literary 
history by considering the experience of reading literature as a form of gestural impregnation. 
Within the broad context of what is now frequently referred to as “media archeology”, reading 
tales, short stories, novels or plays appears as a complex form of immersion in fictional 
universes, leading the immersed subject to develop specific relational gestures—in a very 
similar manner to the way in which a Wii player is led to execute certain bodily gestures when 
interacting with the machine. 
I will first suggest that the type of relational gestures inculcated through literature over 
the past centuries should be analyzed in close connection with the development of political 
economy. I will then attempt to show how literary studies, as well as the humanities at large, 
deserve to be reframed in order to accommodate the softness of interpretive gestures against 
the hardness of machine protocols. In a brief last section, I will sketch some of the ways in 
which literary interpretation can inspire claims for new human rights within a broad political 
ecology of gestures. 
Because my argument is (ridiculously) wide and far-reaching, I will only be able to 
sketch it within the limits of this article—hence its rather dogmatic style, which will assert a 
series of quasi-dogmatic theses. In an issue devoted to the theme of reading, I will leave it to 
the reader to connect the dots—hoping that the resulting figure will be more convincing than 
the skeleton presented here only in its most massive features
1
. 
 
 
Fictional Immersion: from Affection to the Inculcation of Gestures 
 
I. To read is to expose oneself to being affected. The development of new media helps 
us reconsider the activity of reading within a new set of analogies and models. While, at least 
since Cervantes’ Don Quixote, it has been often stated that the reader of a novel could be 
absorbed in the fictional world depicted in it; while, at least since the middle of the 18
th
 
century, as Michael Fried has showed, the theatrical apparatus has been explicitly orchestrated 
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around effects of absorption
2
, the explosion of new and ever more powerful technological 
means of production of virtual reality over the last decades can be read in close parallel with a 
renewed theoretical interest in the processes of simulation and fictional immersion
3
. Reading 
a short story or a novel used to present strong analogies with seeing a play or watching a 
movie: the reader enters a different “virtual” world, separated in space and time from her 
actual reality; she does her best to disconnect her senses from what is close to her (a coughing 
neighbor, a worry about a sick relative) in order to project herself into another world sketched 
by the sentences read on the page, which conduct her imagination into “seeing” the unfolding 
of the plot, as she could see the story staged in a theater or projected on a screen. 
This cinematic model already included emotional reaction on the part of the 
reader/viewer. We are told that the first spectators of the Lumière Brothers’ Train arriving in 
La Ciotat’s Station (1896) feared they would be crushed by the approaching locomotive and 
fled in a panic. True or legendary, this reaction illustrates the obvious fact that readers and 
viewers are necessarily affected by what they perceive, even if the specific nature of this 
affection obviously varies from medium to medium, from genre to genre, from book to book. 
Outwardly, we are led to laugh, or smile, or cry, while watching a movie or reading a fiction; 
inwardly, each twist of the plot, each choice of picture or word elicits a certain reaction of joy 
or sadness, depending on the way in which we are led to situate ourselves within the narrative 
world. 
The complex but enlightening (even if somewhat trendy
4
) definition of the affect 
elaborated by Spinoza in his Ethics (1677) helps us understand one crucial feature of such a 
fictional immersion: the affects are always double-sided. My passions, emotions, feelings, 
sentiments (all possible translations for the Latin affectus) can be simultaneously seen as what 
is (passively) imprinted in me by my relations to my environment (I am blinded by the sun in 
my face, I am irritated by my boss’ remark, I am aroused by a seductive look), and as what I 
do in (active) reaction to such affections (closing my eyes, quitting my job, approaching the 
charming person).  In Spinozese: an affect is both a sensory affectio, (necessarily) imposed on 
the individual by his or her relation to the environment, and a (no less necessary) variation in 
his or her agency (potentia agendi). In other words: one cannot be (emotionally) affected by 
what one reads without being made to react to it in a certain manner. The fact that this 
necessary reaction can be trained to evolve, according to the type of associations the 
individual’s imagination tends to make between images and emotions, provides the backbone 
for a Spinozist ethics, conceived as an effort to “re-concatenate” our affections. 
Devices like the Wii offer a caricature of the principle that affection and agency are two 
sides of the same coin. The truth of the activity of reading, of course, is a lot more 
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complicated. We are not Don Quixote, nor do we run out of movie theaters when a train 
enters a station in a film. Until recently, the aesthetic experience involving fiction—contained 
within an atopian space of “willing suspension of disbelief”—was described as involving an 
inhibition of our bodily reactions to the fictional events. It was characteristic of ridiculous 
Quixotic figures (“peasants” or “savages” discovering theater for the first time) to attempt to 
intervene (physically) in the story displayed on stage, or to write to the publisher and offer 
their help to an imaginary character. 
II. To read modern literature is to be trained in developing relational gestures. 
Immersion in digitally-produced virtual reality, anticipated by certain devices like the 
Cinemascope, the Imax, or movies in 3D, gave us a fresh look on the matter. My body can 
feel vertigo in an Imax theater, and interactive games expect me to react physically to a 
simulation. What is suspense, however, if not a nervous (i.e., physical) tension affecting my 
body as a result of my reading a story? When I “feel good” (or bad) about a fictional act, 
when I experience sympathy for a character, my identification with him leads me to mimic the 
relational gestures performed within the fictional world.  
By “relational gestures”, I mean mental attitudes 1) caused by the perception of certain 
social relations within a certain social situation (on the side of the affectio), and 2) pushing the 
observer towards certain forms of intervention in this situation (on the side of the potentia 
agendi). While the active intervention is obviously inhibited in the case of fictional narratives, 
the affects are nevertheless (more or less fully) experienced by the reading subject. When 
Augustus “forgives” Cinna in Corneille’s tragedy, when Henri Meyer shows his “care” for a 
young seamstress in Isabelle de Charrière’s Letters written from Neuchâtel, when a rake 
“seduces” his victim in a libertine novel, they all perform certain relational gestures which 
trigger in the reader powerful affective reactions (of relief, frustration, disgust, suspicion, 
etc.). 
Even if, as we will soon see, reading cannot be reduced to psychological identification, 
it would be unrealistic to disqualify such reactions, which are part and parcel of our narrative 
experience. Reading a novel, watching a play or a movie pushes us not only to mimic, but to 
experience certain relational gestures “from the inside” of the character’s mind, as it were. 
That such an experience, repeated dozens, hundreds or thousands of times, tends to build 
certain habits in the reader-viewer seems rather obvious: we learn to act (in real life) by 
experiencing relational gestures in narrative immersion. Over the last 300 years, as reading 
became accessible to ever larger segments of our populations, and, later, as audio-visual 
entertainment spread among all social classes, narratives have trained us to be the ethical 
agents we have become. 
 
 
The Political Economy of Immersive Gestures 
 
III. The modern novel has been a near-perfect companion to the shaping of homo 
oeconomicus. It has become a commonplace within the humanities to consider literature as a 
form of resistance to the hegemony of economics over the development of Western 
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modernity
5
. While a good case can be made for such an argument, I would like to sketch an 
alternative view, which stresses the ambivalence of the relation between literature and 
economics (aka, Capitalism). 
Although literature professors often enjoy considering themselves as free-thinkers, 
subversive agents and intellectual rebels, literature as a discipline and as an institution—at 
least in France—has most of the time sided with power and social domination. Either because 
they were inflicted upon students by zealous teachers in the name of a superior canon (under 
the threat of bad grades and social stigma), or because they were duly aligned with the 
dominant ideologies of the times, most successful and widely-read novels of the nineteenth 
and twentieth century have trained their readers into being “good working men and women” 
rather than rebellious souls. The fact that yesterday’s rebel comes to be worshiped within 
today’s canon tends to twist our perception: at each given period, readers have been 
inculcated into socializing gestures, rather than subversive ones. If the relational gestures 
experienced in novels do indeed train us to develop certain habits, then novels are to be 
counted among the main culprits for the production of the modern homo oeconomicus. 
A quick survey of the remarkably parallel developments of political economy and the 
novel, considered here mostly from within the French tradition, should suffice to raise our 
suspicion. The modern novel emerged (with Lesage, Marivaux, Prévost or Richardson) at the 
same time when the groundwork for political economy was laid down by Boisguilbert, Melon, 
Cantillon, Quesnay, Turgot and Adam Smith
6
. Both parallel traditions staged individuals 
motivated by what Bruno Latour recently called “passionate interests”, collapsing the 
distinction suggested earlier by Albert Hirschman’s classical study The Passions and the 
Interests
7
. Classical political economy attempted to explain, map, model and ultimately 
control the outward behavior of  agents whose tormented affects were analyzed and 
scrutinized by the narrators of romans-mémoires. When contemporary critics made fun of the 
novelists’ lengthy and pretentious subtlety in dissecting the most minute and insignificant 
change of mind of their characters, they did not understand what was at stake in this literary 
genre, inherited from the previous decades (just as political economy itself has been presented 
as a direct heir to a Jansenist disillusioned vision of man
8
): from Marivaux to Stendhal, 
through Rousseau and Goethe, the novel simultaneously analyzed, categorized, colonized, and 
shaped our relational gestures. By immersing the readers in situations described in such a way 
that they could identify with the conundrums and dilemmas experienced by the main 
characters, such narratives progressively trained ever wider segments of our populations 
simultaneously to feel (fictional) passions and to take enough distance towards them, in order 
to measure their consequences within a calculation of their best interests (and moral 
attachments). 
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Towards the end of the nineteenth century, as political economy was taking its 
neoclassical marginalist turn (focusing on differentials of intensities located on borderline 
situations), the novel too was led to abandon its previous double vision (subjective affects 
perceived within larger fields of aggregated interests), in order to investigate self-absorbed 
affections increasingly shut off from, or disillusioned with, the resources of instrumental 
rationality. From Huysmans to Blanchot, through Proust, Svevo and Joyce, the novel went 
through its own marginalist revolution, replacing a claim to decipher the true value of things 
and behaviors with a more modest attempt  to register the differentials of intensities 
experienced by disoriented subjectivities. 
As for the formalist turn which took over (French) literature from the 1950s on, it would 
be tempting to set it against the background of the exacerbated formalization of an economic 
science increasingly running on mathematic models, ready to be plugged into algorithmic 
cybernetics. From the Nouveau Roman experiments to the Oulipo and the radical aesthetics of 
Tel Quel, soon echoed by the structuralist grip on literary criticism, the novel became (briefly) 
obsessed with numbers, pseudo-scientific formulas, and systematic distributions (rather than 
the production, dissection, or evaluation of affects).  
Of course, the actual audience of such avant-gardist experiments was extremely limited, 
and it would be ludicrous to claim that they “shaped” in any way the homo oeconomicus of 
the late twentieth century. For, under the surface of these three long phases of parallel 
unfolding of our economic and novelistic discourses, a deeper and more important dynamic 
relation was at work on the articulation zones where affects and gestures meet narratives and 
social control. 
IV. Thanks to their critical and adaptive dimensions, literary (and, later, 
cinematic) immersive gestures have provided the challenges and resources which 
allowed semiocapitalism to colonize most of our life forms. Political economy was not 
merely a matter of discourse. It accompanied an unprecedented process of industrialization, 
which is still restructuring the lives of billions of humans on the Asian continent, and which 
can be broadly characterized by five correlated features: 1) automation of physical gestures 
delegated to machines; 2) residual need for limited human  intervention through impoverished 
and unskilled gestures on the factory line; 3) top-down organization of labor; 
4) unprecedented profits generated mostly by economies of scale; 5) basic learning and skills 
transmitted through explicit rules and protocols. 
The development, analysis, classification, inculcation of relational gestures provided 
through fictional immersion and aesthetic experiences over the past three hundred years 
should be understood against this general background. For, of course, reading a novel, even 
the worst type of tear-jerker, involves much more than mere immersion through naïve 
identification with the protagonist. Readers are not only aware of the simulated nature of 
fictional situations; by knowing they are dealing with signs rather than with real life, they 
entertain an inherently distanced and potentially critical relation to the affective gestures they 
may be led to simulate.  
Thanks to this reflective and critical posture, while readers are simultaneously immersed 
in some form of virtual reality, reading literature directly counter-effects the five features of 
industrialization mentioned above: 1) by its massive mobilization of affects and (sexual) 
desires, narratives relocate the source of movement in humans rather than machines; 2) by 
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exploring the difficulties and problems raised in inter-human relations, they lead to the 
identification, imitation, and massive inculcation of ever more complex relational gestures, 
involving an increasingly large number of agents; 3) by throwing us in the middle of a 
difficult situation, they force us to elaborate bottom-up or horizontal (rather than top-down) 
responses to problems of coordinating actions among humans; 4) by immersing us in a 
particular (and always different) knot of relations, they foster the invention of singular 
solutions, crafted on a case by case basis (against the homogenizing logic of economies of 
scale); 5) by staging complex reactions to which we are led to identify, they transmit skills by 
the virtue of imitation and exemplarity, which is the most efficient way to communicate 
gestures (rather than through explicit commands and protocols). 
The inculcation of relational gestures—through literature, and later films and TV 
series—can thus be seen as the other (necessary and complementary) side of industrialization. 
Modernization (capitalism) needed entertainment (spectacle) to nurture desires, adaptive and 
relational skills, in its collaborators/consumers. Aesthetic experiences provided the field of 
experimentation, invention, adjustment, dissemination necessary for the elaboration of the 
social gestures on which productive collaboration depends.  
As capitalism, in its richest countries, moved from its industrial form towards an 
economy of services, communication and entertainment, more and more feedback loops could 
be observed between the signs used as means of production and the signs used to mobilize the 
desires of the collaborating/consuming populations—leading to what Guy Debord called “the 
society of the spectacle”, Jean Baudrillard “full screen” (écran total, aka “hyperreality”), or, 
more recently, Franco  ‘Bifo’ Berardi “semiocapitalism.” By emphasizing the role of signs in 
the circulation of wealth, power and desires, this latter label is the most appropriate for my 
overall argument
9
. It suggests that what was described earlier in terms of affects should 
always also be approached in terms of signs. This helps us to understand the complementarity 
between widely disseminated “traditional” (immersive) types of narratives, calling for the 
reader to identify with the characters, and “avant-garde” formalist experiments, toying with 
self-reflective awareness and self-critical postures.  
For immersive and critical gestures, far from being incompatible, are rather to be seen 
as reversely proportional components of our relations to any narrative. Reading novels, 
whatever their genre, refinement or popularity, remains first and foremost an exposure to, and 
management of, signs. The complex moves by which we react to the phrases read on the page 
are inseparably affective and intellectual, narrative and aesthetic: as Marielle Macé has 
eloquently shown, the reading experience “conducts our conduct” on the two superimposed 
levels of stylistic orientation, within the sentence, and of existential orientation, within our life 
forms: “we need to consider reading as a form of conduct, or behavior, rather than as a form 
of deciphering. A conduct “within” the books: a matter of attention, perception, experience, a 
mental, physical and affective wayfaring within language forms. But also a conduct “with” 
the books, and even a conduct “by” the books, as our life finds guidance in them: a matter of 
interpretation, use, application of what we read into what we do in our individual lives.”10 
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My insistence on putting the notion of gesture at the core of our aesthetic experiences is 
motivated by the inherently semiotic nature of gestures: while we may (foolishly) believe that 
an agent executes an act as a result of some spontaneous and self-sufficient urge, we all know 
that a gesture is something made to be performed under the gaze of an actual or potential 
audience. Gestures are what our social fabric is made of, more than ever before in the age of 
semiocapitalism and its “cinematic mode of production”11. 
The more active the reader (as described by theorists of reader-response criticism), the 
more reflective she is towards the signs that mediate the potentially immersive experience, the 
more dynamism her reading will bring into the echoing chamber of gestures generated by and 
around a narrative. In its ceaseless need for competitive reconfigurations, semiocapitalism 
needs all of us to be virtuosi in juggling with our various masks, faces, and profiles, moving 
as fluidly as possible in and out of the many contradictory social roles we are led to play. 
Through the immersive and critical gestures they have triggered in their readers and viewers, 
novels, plays, films, and television series have been the gym halls in which, over the last three 
hundred years, we have practiced the moves that now allow us to survive the multifarious 
schizophrenias semiocapitalism imposes upon us. 
 
 
The Humanities as Reflective Practices of Interpretive Gestures 
 
V. The widening and intensifying domination of automated protocols, generated by 
semiocapitalism over our most vital moves, calls for making human gestures a primary 
frontier of resistance. In the wake of André Leroi-Gourhan’s influential book Le Geste et la 
parole (1964)
 12
, a common evolutionary narrative widespread among anthropologists has 
portrayed modernization and industrialization as leading to a progressive atrophy of our 
gestural skills. Craftsmen of the past inherited complex, subtle, and refined bodily gestures 
necessary to weave a basket, to sculpt clay, or to carve wood through a patient social training 
based on imitation, trial, and error
13
. As our productive forces were dramatically increased 
with the advent of the needle factory celebrated by Adam Smith, the bodily gestures 
accomplished by each individual worker suffered from a no less dramatic impoverishment, 
being reduced to repetitive and mechanical moves dictated by the assembly line, as 
emblematically depicted in Charlie Chaplin’s Modern Times. As machines have taken over 
the production of our chairs, tables, pots, and pans, the human hand tends to lose its inherited 
skills—as currently witnessed by those of us who find it increasingly hard to write (legible 
sentences) by hand, due to the ubiquitous presence of keyboards, tablets, and printers. 
Leroi-Gourhan’s main insight, contemporary to Marshall McLuhan’s, led many to 
consider computerization (still at its early stage in 1964) as the next logical step in the same 
process of externalizng sequences of operations (chaînes opératoires) previously embodied 
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within individual skills. As the assembly line externalized our bodily gestures, the computer 
externalizes our mental operations, leading humans to be progressively expropriated from 
their individual body and brain. This evolution, which started with our physical skills and 
later extended to basic mental tasks like calculus, computation, chess, or word processing, is 
now extending to our relational gestures: the whole field identified as “algorithmic 
governance” deals with the way each individual deals with his or her social environment. 
When amazon.com suggests a new book I should be interested in (taking over the relational 
gestures previously performed by my neighborhood bookseller), when surveillance systems 
flash my internet connections and email exchanges as corresponding to a potential “terrorist” 
profile (taking over the job previously performed by a secret service agent), when automated 
trading invests and divests millions of dollars in a matter of milliseconds (taking over the 
intuitive but slower judgment of a human trader), or when, some day in a post-human future, 
my electronic messaging service sends customized responses to most of the hundreds of 
emails flowing daily into my in-box (as post-humanist guru Ray Kurzweil promises will 
happen within a few years
14
)—in all such cases our relational gestures, patiently inculcated by 
three centuries of novels, theater, films, and television series, are externalized, threatening to 
leave our mental and relational skills as dramatically atrophied as our bodily capacities. 
As demonstrated by the daily madness of automated trading, semiocapitalism thrives on 
the accelerating circulation of signs, with little regard to the way in which these signs are 
lived (or not) by actual subjectivities. As Friedrich Kittler noted in a famous article, software 
and hardware are so intimately intertwined that it is virtually impossible to maintain a clear-
cut distinction between the two
15
: the chains of signs and symbols comprised within a 
computer program “write ahead” (pro-grammein) our behavior as mechanically as the 
machine commands the worker’s gestures on the assembly line. Alexander Galloway has 
demonstrated how, in our supposedly decentralized world made of social networks and 
“freely” chosen connections, power and control exist through the “protocols” which pre-write 
our interactions
16
. Software and computing machines are only the latest avatars of a much 
longer evolution, started many centuries ago with the development of state bureaucracy, 
which was for a long time the first and main source of imposed protocols (military, judicial, 
fiscal). All such protocols have in common pre-set parameters which rigidly condition the 
forms of human interactions. Even when their stated goal is to be open to any type of content, 
as it is the case on the world wide web, they constrain and mechanically pro-gram our 
relational gestures in order to foster their communicability.  
Computerized protocols mark a new stage in the development of semiocapitalism for at 
least two reasons. Their potentially oppressive power of control rests on the difference 
between what Félix Guattari (inelegantly but accurately) called “signifying” vs. “a-signifying” 
semiotics. As Maurizio Lazzarato has shown, our dominant Foucaldian tradition has taught us 
to identify “power” with institutions relying on “signifying semiotics” to induce various 
processes of subjectivation: these institutions (schools, legal courts, social services, market 
competition) call on humans to behave as individual subjects by sending signs addressed to 
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these subjects’ freedom to comply or not. A grade, a law, a requisite, a price are all signs the 
subject must identify and interpret as signs within a certain “signifying semiotics”. 
By contrast, when I introduce my debit card in an ATM machine, the automated teller 
does indeed send me various signs and signals (“press here for fast cash”, “enter your code”, 
“take your card”). But these signs are part of an “a-signifying semiotics”, because they do not 
address me as a subject, i.e., as an agent who can choose to respond within an open range of 
options. All my possible responses are strictly pre-set—pro-grammed—by a protocol-writer. 
While I can always argue with an obtuse bureaucrat (even if unsuccessfully), I can’t argue 
with an ATM machine, an automated telephone service, or an online registration site. There is 
nothing to argue about, since my expected behavior is not one of interpretation, but of 
execution
17
. 
Signs are exchanged in these devices, on which semiocapitalism increasingly relies in 
order to reduce costs and push profits higher. But this exchange of signs is not addressed to us 
as subjects, but as pre-set machines. We dialogue with them in the same fashion a computer 
“dialogues” with another computer during automated trading. Within any given situation, 
stimuli and responses are fully conditioned by each other (if you want sixty dollars from the 
ATM, all your utterances will have been already pre-scripted for you). 
It is within the growing grip of a-signifying semiotics on the current developments of 
semiocapitalism that the status of gestures should be reassessed. Our subjective experience of 
gesture rests on its resistance to being reduced to a purely mechanical move. The assembly 
line atrophies our gestures, not because it leaves the human body inert, but because it imposes 
physical moves which the subject can hardly experience as “his or her own gestures”. In order 
for a physical movement to be recognized as “my gesture”, I need to feel that it comes from 
me (even as a reaction to an external stimulus): I must be able to imprint my singularity, my 
“style”, on it—indeed my “identity” or my “subjectivity” entirely results from the imposition 
of a singular style on the various gestures performed by my body. 
The same is even more obviously true of our relational gestures (which always express 
themselves through some form of physical gesture, of course). My social identity is the sum 
of the gestures I make when interacting with other human subjects (smiles, signs of 
appeasement, of caring, of sympathy, of aggression, of accusation, of forgiving, etc.). A most 
important political struggle, at all levels of our lives, consist therefore in asserting, defending, 
and reclaiming the status of our human and subjective relational gestures against the 
generalization of mechanical a-signifying semiotics imposed by the race to profit that is 
driving semiocapitalism. 
VI. The oppressive power of the protocols set in place by semiocapitalism rests on 
our digital illiteracy, i.e., on our inability to read and rewrite the software which 
commands our interface with hardware. The second reason why computerized protocols 
mark a new stage in the development of semiocapitalism will bring us back to the issue of 
reading (and writing). Computers impose a-signifying semiotics upon us only because most of 
us are illiterate: if only we could enter into the programming language of the software, as it 
designs our interface with the hardware, the functioning semiotics would no longer appear to 
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us as “a-signifying”. Two distinct but closely related problems should be addressed on this 
issue.  
First, in contrast with the signifying semiotics used within traditional human 
interactions, the a-signifying semiotics used in our interface with machines leave no room for 
interpretation. As we all know, there is no margin of error when you type a command or when 
you enter data into a computerized protocol. Either the string of characters corresponds to the 
protocol’s expectations or it does not, depending on what has been initially programmed in 
the machine. A human reader will spontaneously correct a typo when she reads a book; a 
computer will either not notice it and include the error in the data as if it were accurate, or 
completely block the protocol, if it cannot recognize the string of characters among the valid 
possibilities pre-programmed into the software. Even if our intelligent machines execute 
amazingly complex computations, they often look irritatingly “dumb” when, for instance, 
they block a process as simple as ordering a product online, only because my (French) zip 
code is not recognized among the list of valid (American) zip codes written in the software. 
To put it in simplistic but traditional language, human communication is “free” (to err and 
correct itself), while machines work in a strictly deterministic (and “mechanical”) fashion. 
Second, contrary to a common misconception, the mechanical (and dumb) reaction of 
the machines is no more inherent in their “nature” than “freedom” is inherent in ours. While 
our first experiences with computers frequently led us to face a wall of inflexible dumbness 
(as illustrated by the zip code example), we are increasingly granted  “intelligent” machines 
which can double-guess our desires, correct our mistakes when we enter a typo, and guide our 
searches on the internet by providing strings of characters similar to those most frequently 
entered. Over the last decades, thanks to countless breakthroughs in the design of the Human 
Computer Interface (HCI), we have witnessed (and benefitted from) an amazing softening of 
the way in which, through a further elaboration of the software, hardware responds to our 
demands
18
.  
Just as our “free” behavior may result from a unique entanglement of multifarious 
determinations, similarly, this softening of the software results from a certain margin of 
interpretation which can be written in the machines, so that they behave in a less dumb and 
apparently more intelligent fashion. The latest research on the neural processes involved in 
the activity of reading reveals “a massively parallel system where all neurons compute 
simultaneously” within a “pandemonium” model relying on the brute quantitative force of 
mechanical computing rather than on the traditional view of the subtle finesse specific to 
human intelligence
19
. 
However, while neurobiologists try their best to understand the (mechanical) way in 
which our (dumb) neurons manage to process something as maddeningly complex as the 
activity of reading, most human readers have not yet seriously tried to understand (and 
control) the ways in which our computing machines process our social interactions. Very few 
of us have ever attempted to look under the hood of the protocols which structure our 
communication with machines and, through these machines, with our fellow-subjects. Most of 
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us humans—and specially “humanists” —seem to be content with our digital illiteracy. We 
blame (and despise) computing machines and protocols for their dumbness, but we don’t give 
ourselves the intellectual and practical tools to intervene in the making, correcting, 
restructuring, hijacking—i.e., “hacking”—of these protocols. Hackers and hacktivists may be 
the true Humanists and cultural critics of our age. 
In other words, there is no ontological abyss between “a-signifying” and “signifying” 
semiotics (deterministic vs. free, machine vs. human, meaningless vs. meaningful). There is 
only a collective cognitive deficiency, which leads most of us to hit our heads against the 
mechanical nature of the protocols which increasingly guide and structure our lives, only 
because we are incapable of reading (and rewriting) the software in which such protocols 
determine our interaction with the hardware—and, further down the line of mediation, with 
the human subjects connected to these medias. 
VII. No less than catalysts of literacy, the humanities should reposition themselves 
as reflective practices of interpretation. We are enslaved by mechanical protocols mostly 
because we can’t read and (re)write them in a more humane fashion; we need to expand our 
literacy by understanding how the machines read (and hence format) our desires; we need to 
reflect upon (and expand) the margins of interpretation which soften the hardware’s responses 
to our needs and queries. If the previous sections of this article have managed to establish 
such premises, then it should be clear that the disciplines collected under the banner of “the 
humanities” are positioned to play a crucial role in overcoming the collective cognitive 
deficiency which threatens our agency in the age of semiocapitalism. 
As historians, anthropologists, philosophers, linguists, cinema theorists, or literary 
scholars, we all share a set of common intellectual features which define us as experts in the 
softness of interface. Along the lines sketched above to distinguish mechanical reactions from 
human gestures, it seems fair to say that the humanities explore, map and tread the countless 
fracture lines which separate recognition from interpretation. If facts could be merely 
“recognized”, in the same mechanical fashion a computer recognizes a preprogrammed set of 
characters, there would be little need for the humanities. We write books and articles, we talk 
in class and in colloquia because the data that fuel human lives, at all levels, cannot merely be 
“read”, like barcodes, but need to be “interpreted”, pretty much like enigmatic poems. Most 
often, these data are not simply things or facts, but themselves consist of interpretations: an 
anthropologist, a historian, a linguist, a film or a literary critic interpret the ways in which 
human subjects interpret a gesture, an event, a sentence, or an image.  
Across their diversity, the humanities at large can therefore be described  as reflective 
practices of interpretation
20
. We certainly have no monopoly on the activity of interpretation, 
which is practiced by the hard sciences as well as by all of us, as soon as our daily routines 
slip away from what can be merely recognized within preexisting categories. However, our 
main and specific task as humanists consists in interpreting our interpretations, i.e., in 
constructing explicit reflections on the way we humans interpret our world. 
In other words: the humanities foster the development of interpretive gestures. Those 
who denounce cultural studies, deconstruction, literary scholarship and film theory as a waste 
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of time (for the students) and as a waste of resources (for our economy) are not totally wrong 
when they portray our activities as a form of gesticulation. In front of our students or in front 
of our colleagues, we perform relational and interpretive moves which probably carry more 
weight as theatrical “gestures” (addressed to an audience) than as cognitive “actions” (adding 
data to our knowledge of reality). 
Reading and interpreting literature consists of simultaneously immersing oneself in a 
narrative world and constructing reflective postures towards that narrative world. The 
posturing is an intrinsic part of the literary experience—and, more broadly, of the humanities 
at large. Between the university scholar publishing erudite articles in academic journals and 
the lay reader immersed in a novel during a beach vacation, the difference is more a matter of 
degree than of essential nature. Both get to be, at some point, immersed in the stories they 
read; both are led, at some point, to take some critical distance towards what they read, if only 
in order to tell their partner what the story is about, whether it is worth reading or not, and 
why. 
The history of literary criticism could be succinctly reduced to a succession of different 
types of interpretive gestures—and gesticulations. Thus literary history postured as a 
positivist reinscribing of the literary work within the socio-historical context of its emergence; 
hermeneutics posed, in front of a mirror and in slow motion, as a projective extraction of 
meaning out of a given textual material; structuralist poetics proudly displayed its virtuosity in 
reducing multifarious textual expressions to a mere combination within a limited set of 
abstract categories; deconstruction gesticulated, again and again, to the same basic trick of 
showing how any claim to truth ends up betraying some obscure awareness of its own 
impossibility; cultural studies performed the same gesture of dipping the text in the 
developing bath of class, race, and gender in order to reveal its biases and/or emancipatory 
potentials.  
More recently, the “théorie des textes possibles”, initiated by and around Michel 
Charles and Marc Escola, invites us to perform a gesture of amplification, allowing the critic 
to actualize an episode that remains only virtual in the published text
21
. Christophe Hanna and 
his accomplices, reunited around the publishing house Questions théoriques, call for gestures 
which tend to short-circuit the distance inherent in interpretive (and aesthetic) positioning: 
literary works, just like ATMs, trigger functional responses, largely based on execution and a-
signifying semiotics, as much as they trigger hermeneutical forms of reflective 
understanding
22
. In Uses of Literature, Rita Felski has gathered these many forms of 
(interpretative and post-interpretive) postures under the four basic categories of recognition, 
enchantment, knowledge and shock: recognition allows us to identify with an alien 
subjectivity through an immersive enchantment enclosing us “in a bubble of absorbed 
attention”, leaving us “sucked in, swept up, spirited away”, “mesmerized, hypnotized, 
possessed”, “sapping [our] sense of autonomy and self-control” (similarly to our post-
interpretive interface with a-signifying semiotics)—which in its turn leads to the alternate 
effects of shock, received from being thrown into an alien environment, and knowledge, 
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brought by the possibility of “knowing something of what it feels like to be inside a particular 
habitus”23. 
VIII. The humanities are designed to work towards the softening of our protocols 
of interaction. All these different types of gestures displayed within the literary field over the 
past hundred years can probably be observed, with some alterations, in the many disciplines 
gathered under the banner of the humanities. Taken together, these interpretive gestures 
practiced and promoted by the humanities have the capacity to act jointly towards the 
softening of our protocols. This softening effect can be located on at least three levels. 
1) The very nature of interpretation makes it a “soft” activity, whether its object is a 
literary text, a picture, a concept, a historical event, a ritual, or a collected set of scientific 
data. Interpreting calls for much more complex gestures than reading. The activity of 
reading—which, of course, almost never takes place in its pure form and always involve some 
amount of interpretation—can in principle be reduced to the “hard” (i.e., purely mechanical) 
sorting out of data according to preprogrammed categories and protocols, as illustrated in the 
most basic case by a scanner reading a barcode. By contrast, as Richard Shusterman has 
powerfully shown
24
, we only launch a process of interpretation when preexisting categories 
fail to give us a grip on what is at hand. We have recourse to the necessary softness of 
interpretation when our hardened protocols prove unable to manage the constant novelty 
springing up in our experience. In other words, interpretation is all about leeway, i.e., about 
using or generating a margin of movement within the constraints of predefined procedures. 
2°)In multiplying—often artificially—the opportunities to practice reflective 
interpretation, the humanities can be considered as a form of intellectual gymnastics, flexing 
the adaptive muscles on which we rely to overcome the shortcomings of pre-established 
protocols. It is the heterogeneity of the interpretive gestures we are led to accomplish, when 
faced with various types of texts, pictures, or narratives, which helps us the most in flexing 
these muscles. Rather than developing one favorite method of interpretation (literary history, 
hermeneutics, structuralism, deconstruction, cultural studies, and the like)—as dissertation 
directors often advised their doctoral students to do—we should make it a point to combine 
various and potentially heterogeneous approaches, since the invention of unchartered 
combinations and inflections among preexisting protocols defines the core activity and values 
of the humanities.  
3) Reading and interpreting literature (or films, or arguments, or myths, or rituals, or 
historical trends) also tends to soften our interactive procedures because its transmission relies 
on the imitative dynamics of exemplarity, rather than on programming by command. As 
Timothy Hampton has shown in a book devoted to the Renaissance, exemplarity has always 
played a crucial role in our relation to literature
25
. Italian critic Daniele Giglioli recently 
suggested that literary studies should re-invent themselves around the dynamics of gestural 
exemplarity: “Critique and theory should evolve from interpretation to exemplification, they 
should consider themselves not so much as thought or communication than as gestures, as 
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performances, as events, as constitutive processes which provide themselves with their own 
rules along the way of their unfolding”. When teachers and critics work on a text in front of 
students or fellow-researchers, “they should claim to those who listen: what matters is not 
what I say, nor the method I use to say it, but rather the very fact that I manage to speak 
through the techniques I use. Not: see what is in this text! But: see what can be done by 
reading, hearing and scrutinizing this text! […] It is only by moving from enunciation to 
gesture, from symbol to example, from discourse to action, that theory and critique can still 
hope to have a future”26.  
Because we, in the humanities, focus our attention on the processes of interpretation, 
our work is to be located at the interface between pre-existing programs and emerging 
expressive needs and desires. This work on the interface requires a softness of approach 
which goes against both the rigidity of top-down command (as it is imposed in 
administration) and the systematicity required from the “hard” sciences. We therefore must 
claim gestures as our main mode of performance, since human gestures, while obviously 
shaped by previous training and structured by environmental constraints, display an 
exemplary capacity to transcend their programming. 
 
 
Towards a Political Ecology of Gestures, 
or Literature Everyware 
 
IX. Through their softening agency, the Humanities provide a crucial set of sites 
and tools in order to promote the humanity of gestures against the pre-formatting of 
protocols. Let me survey the rather sinuous and rushed trajectory of my argument so far. I 
started by emphasizing the “affective” nature of our reading experience: in triggering 
emotional reactions to the fictional situations in which we immerse ourselves, reading 
contributes to shaping our relational gestures, which are imported and adapted from fictional 
worlds and made part of our actual agency. I then suggested that reading novels (as well as, 
later, watching movies and television) played an important role in formatting our modern 
gestures, desires, and subjectivity along the lines needed by capitalism in order to rely on the 
adaptive collaboration of individual agents, as these agents are constantly expected to espouse 
transindividual trends while constantly being called to invent more livable ways to adjust their 
relational movements. The inculcation of relational gestures through reading (and later 
through the expansion of audiovisual narratives) is to be seen as the true manufacture of homo 
oeconomicus, insofar as this awkward species cannot operate as a merely self-interested factor 
of production endowed with “rational expectations” (as neoliberal economic “science” would 
have us believe), but must sustain his productive work on a much deeper and wider affective 
relational ground.  
I then staged a major tension between gestures and protocols within the development of 
a later phase of modernity, here called semiocapitalism with reference to Franco Berardi’s 
analyses. Through the processes of industrialization, state bureaucracy, and now 
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computerization, our societies have pushed further than ever before the programming of our 
behavior, i.e., the tendency to “pre-write” and pre-format our relational movements. Within 
this multi-secular history, programming has passed through various phases, which Foucault, 
Kittler, Debord, Baudrillard, Deleuze and Guattari, and Hardt and Negri have helped 
summarize as consisting of roughly  three stages (the logic of the earlier stage never fully 
disappears, but it is mainly reconfigured within the later stage). In the age of Sovereignty, a 
rather weak central power attempted to impose minimal commands top-down, along 
centralized networks; in the age of Discipline, a multiplicity of more or less loosely 
articulated institutions attempted to train individuals in order to program rigid behaviors 
within decentralized networks; in our age of Control, “distributed networks” rely on each 
individual’s capacity to adapt to the requirements, pressures, and evolutions of the 
collaborative grid within the constraints specified by the various protocols which format our 
diverse levels of interaction. 
As Alexander Galloway often stresses in his book, the main question, in the age of 
Control, is “not that protocol is bad, but that protocol is dangerous”: “for all its faults, 
protocological control is still an improvement over other forms of social control”27. I have 
characterized this danger by opposing programs to gestures. Protocols have always existed, in 
the form of rituals, judicial procedures, administrative requirements, rules of engagement, 
managerial practices. It is the mechanization of protocols through our recent information and 
communication technologies which raises new dangers, along with amazing new possibilities.  
The performative nature of our gestures must be strongly asserted, defended, practiced, 
and cultivated  in order to counterbalance the reduction of human agency to mere execution 
brought by the inescapable mechanization of our interactions. By performative, I mean first 
that gestures are theatrical performances, as opposed to actions: they are meant to be seen, 
they are addressed to an audience (even if only a virtual one), they always include a 
dimension of make-believe, which is not necessarily deceptive, since even when we speak the 
truth, we do so in an attempt to make our audience believe it is the truth.  
By performative, I also mean that the specific power of gestures relies on their status as 
athletic performance: a sportsman, a musician, a dancer—in fact any “performer” —knows 
that her most rewarding and most acclaimed gestures transcend her previous training as well 
as the protocols she had set in place in order to boost her ability. Any successful gesture 
includes a dimension of improvisation which decisively exceeds its original programming.  
Finally, as a consequence of this improvisational excess, by performative, I mean the 
ontological productivity of human gestures, insofar as, by the virtue of their exemplarity, they 
sometimes precipitate the actualization of social movements which had remained only virtual. 
Like performative speech acts, gestures are a way for us to “do real things” with mere words, 
poses, postures, gesticulations, plays. A gesture of defiance may trigger a revolution; a gesture 
of threat may prevent an attack; a gesture of good will may diffuse a conflict. Here again, 
these three connotations of the performative nature of gestures converge in their exemplarity: 
an exemplary gesture inspires imitators and followers by displaying in full view an 
unbelievable feat of unimaginable agency. 
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I hope the previous pages, in spite of their precipitate nature, have at least hinted at how 
the reading of literature is intimately tied to the modern history of gestures. Apart from the 
inculcation of relational gestures, reading literature leads us to enjoy the exemplary power and 
virtuosity of the expressive gestures performed by the writer. As students, teachers, scholars, 
it stimulates us to pursue these expressive feats by constructing our own interpretive gestures, 
along the lines sketched in the texts.  
Literary studies, therefore—and, more broadly, the humanities at large, insofar as we 
conceive them as reflective practices of interpretation—appear as a crucial site for our 
societies to refine the interface through which we interact and collaborate. What is at stake in 
our fields of study is the obstinate resistance of human gestures to any attempt to subsume and 
entrap them in any form of rigid programming protocol. Why this resistance is particularly 
important in the age of semiocapitalism and what it means in terms of the reconfiguration of 
our discipline will be addressed in my concluding point. 
X. Considered within the broader scope of media archaeology, literature is 
everyware. The contradictory tension between the “hard” and the “soft” permeates all of our 
current debates. Whether on the geopolitical field (hard power of troops sent abroad vs. soft 
power of TV series exported), in the management of crime (harshness of punishment vs. 
flexibility of rehabilitation), or in the evaluation of research (individually quantified impact 
index vs. collective percolation of minor initiatives), the softening power of the Humanities 
should be understood within a basic opposition of values, much wider than the traditional 
divide, famously sketched by CP Snow in his 1959 talk, between “the two cultures” of hard 
sciences vs. soft humanities—if only because good science necessarily has to soften itself 
when it goes through a paradigm shift, before hardening again when its new protocols reach 
satisfactory efficiency. 
What is at stake in this opposition is a broader anthropological evolution which relies 
ever more massively on “show business” (aka Debord’s spectacle, Baudrillard’s simulation, 
or McLuhan’s media) in order to coordinate globally our molecular behaviors: the business-
which-organizes-what-is-shown conditions what we do. It does so softly, but ever more 
intimately and intensely. This increasingly crucial importance of  show business is what 
makes gestures more important than ever, since, as I have stressed above, a gesture includes at 
least some awareness of its being displayed to the attention of an audience. This is why 
Franco Berardi’s semiocapitalism appears the most accurate way of  naming our current form 
of social and global organization. Through the development of, first, the printing press, then 
film and television, and now the internet and the world wide web, the capitalist logic of 
development relies increasingly on an ever larger and ever more multi-leveled set of “signs” 
(semeia)—whether through a-signifying or signifying semiotics, through texts, sounds, 
pictures and videos, but also through narratives, arguments, and scientific models. All of these 
signs, in their multifarious diversity, appear within show business in the form of gestures: 
while their constitution as well as their communication obviously rest on (sometimes rigidly 
constrained) protocols, they manage to speak to us only insofar as we identify them as human 
gestures. 
As Matteo Pasquinelli recently argued, show business and its signs should not simply be 
equated with the mediasphere, conceived as something external to our subjectivity, floating 
“out there” in the air waves or through the cables of the internet. Show business constitutes a 
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neurospace which “should not be considered an autonomous media sphere, but a continuum 
between inner and outer landscapes, between the psychological and libidinal life of any 
physical form and object”28. Hence my insistence on situating reading within an economy of 
affects, i.e,, at the place of interaction between exterior affections and interior emotions: the 
interface the humanities can help us to soften and humanize is the one that connects—
worldwide, through the tip of our fingers, the drum of our ears, and the pupil of our eyes—our 
centralized network of nerves with the distributed network of the various machines in which 
we have progressively exteriorized our chains of operations, both physical and mental. 
The new scope of the humanities, therefore, can no longer be limited to “literary” texts, 
or “philosophy”, or “the Arts”. We may well want  to focus our attention occasionally on 
literary texts, but what we are studying and attempting to understand—and soften—is, much 
more broadly and ambitiously, the way human gestures have interacted with communicating 
machines for several hundred years, within the general scope already provided by “media 
archaeology”29. To hijack a neologism referring to the countless miniaturized forms of 
hardware which already permeate our living environment (from smartphones to sensors and 
RFID tags)
30
, reading and interpreting the signs provided in literary texts leads us to see that 
literature is everyware. What we work on is the ubiquitous “wetware” which flows in the 
distributed networks of the hardware through the protocols of the software. 
In order to defend “literature” as a form of  attention to the gestural dimension of any 
expressive move, we not only need to realize it is everyware. We also need to develop a 
political ecology of gestures. Against a political economy which, over the past three decades 
at least, has constantly eroded our interpretive spaces, in the name of market competition, 
consumerist growth, and individualistic property rights, we need to reclaim the 
anthropological centrality of the interpretive gesture. Humans never merely read data or 
execute commands: they interpret signs. The art of interpretation—historically cultivated by 
the humanities, after having been the monopoly of religions during countless centuries—
should be recognized, and funded, as the most vital endeavor of the human adventure. 
XI. A political ecology of gestures calls for three literary human rights: the rights 
to opacity, to equivocation, to reformulation. To conclude this call for a political ecology of 
gestures, I will delineate three eminently literary human rights which show the deep 
continuity that links our practices as literary scholars with much broader political, societal, 
and anthropological claims. 
Edouard Glissant repeated on numerous occasions that the preservation of linguistic and 
cultural diversity depended upon recognizing for everyone a right to opacity: “a general 
consent to particular opacities is the simplest equivalent to non-barbarianism”31. It belongs to 
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the very nature of protocols to homogenize practices and to “promote standardization in order 
to enable openness”32. By requiring the programming and the entering of data to be fully 
explicit in order to fit the requirements of the hardware, computerization imposes 
transparency. Insofar as they transcend preliminary training and routines, human gestures, on 
the contrary, constantly maintain a reserve of opacity. The same reserve of opacity is the 
source of the endless succession of ever changing interpretations literary scholars have 
elaborated when reading canonical works. In claris non fit interpretatio: there can be no 
interpretation without some sort of opacity. Similarly: there can be no truly human gesture 
with an expectation of full transparency. 
Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro stresses how much intra- as well as 
inter-cultural communication relies on the virtue of equivocation, which “is not just one 
among other possible pathologies that threaten communication”, but “a properly 
transcendental category of anthropology, a constitutive dimension of the discipline’s project 
of cultural translation”. Correlative to a right to opacity, a resistance against the 
standardization and univocality brought about by protocols calls for a right to equivocation. 
Here again, this right appears as a necessary implication of the interpretive activity. Were 
there no double meaning—differing meanings that are equally acceptable when considered 
from different points of view—there would be no literary studies, nor anthropology. The 
humanities are needed in order to unfold the perspectival differences which are implicated in 
such equivocation. This is what fuels their endless work of interpretation and translation: “to 
translate is to situate oneself in the space of the equivocation and to dwell there. It is not to 
unmake the equivocation (since this would be to suppose it never existed in the first place)”. 
To interpret, or to translate, “is to emphasize or potentialize the equivocation, that is, to open 
and widen the space imagined not to exist between the conceptual languages in contact, a 
space that the equivocation precisely concealed. The equivocation is not that which impedes 
the relation, but that which founds and impels it: a difference in perspective. To translate is to 
presume that an equivocation always exists; it is to communicate by differences, instead of 
silencing the Other by presuming a univocality—the essential similarity—between what the 
Other and We are saying.”33 
Both opacity and equivocation constitute the reserve of meaning out of which human 
history has drawn its dynamics of renewal and development. Both converge in claiming a 
third right, which lies at the very foundation of the work accomplished by the humanities: a 
right to reformulation. Protocols confront us with “forms” —not aesthetic forms but 
computerized forms, requiring us to fill in pre-parametered blanks. Faced with such forms, we 
have no margin of freedom to rephrase the questions asked or the responses to be given. 
Because the programming languages used in writing software do not express meaning, but 
trigger the execution of operations, they are designed to short-circuit interpretation.  
Once again, literature and the humanities provide a model for the articulation of a 
broader political ecology of gestures. Reading and interpreting literature can be seen as a 
ceaseless exercise in reformulation: no two readers have read, summarized, described, 
analyzed, perceived the same work in exactly the same fashion. Whether interpretive, artistic 
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or athletic, human gestures are always repeated, while never the same: they can be performed 
over and over again, because there are driven by an endless aspiration towards better 
reformulation.  
As stated above, it would be overly simplistic and deceptive to consider computing 
machines as merely antagonistic to human gestures: our relational gestures are multiplied, 
diversified, augmented, and enriched by the availability of new communicating devices, along 
with their protocols. However, a political ecology of gestures requires us to maintain and 
promote the constitution of protected interpretive spaces, within which opacity, equivocation, 
and reformulation can play their role in the refinement of our life worlds. The practice of 
reading literature may provide the blueprint for the next generation of human rights in the age 
of semiocapitalism. 
 
 
 
